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Abstract _ 
The marginal efficiency costs of different taxes is analyzed in three models with endoge-
nous growth, and the values are compared with those found in standard models. The 
models analyze how taxes affect (i) the trade-off between human capital accumulation 
and leisure, (ii) the intertemporal trade-off in consumption, and (iii) the trade-offs in a 
two-sector model. In general, the efficiency cost in models with endogenous growth may 
be greater or lower than in models with exogenous growth. When the value of the effi-
ciency cost is very large, it is found to be very sensitive to the specification of the model, 
and it is reduced dramatically when government expenditures are a production input. In 
the two-sector model, the only tax which has a very high efficiency cost is the tax on 
time spent for human capital accumulation, and it may not be empirically important. 
It is verified that a positive impact of a tax reform on the long-term growth rate is not 
indicative of welfare improvement. 
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1 Introduction 
Recent studies have analyzed mechanisms in which an economy's long-term 
growth rate is endogenous to individual actions, (e.g., Romer (1986), Lu-
cas (1988), and their references). These models have the property that 
economic policy has an impact on long-term growth, (Jones and Manuelli 
(1990), Rebelo (1991), Rebelo and Stokey (1992)). Perhaps because com-
pounded growth rates may produce very large differences in the long-run, it 
has been suggested that in models of endogenous growth, the efficiency cost 
of taxation may be much larger than previously thought. For example, King 
and Rebelo (1990) argue that when the income tax rate is raised from, say, 
20 to 30 percent, the welfare impact is 15 to 60 times larger in a model of 
endogenous growth than in the standard neo-classical model. The purpose 
of this paper is to analyze carefully the efficiency cost of taxation in models 
of endogenous growth. It will be shown that for plausible parameter values 
the difference between the efficiency cost of taxation in models of exogenous 
growth and endogenous growth is not very large. This cost may even be 
smaller in the latter case. 
Since there are no externalities, the standard principles of Public Finance 
apply. These principles state that the welfare cost of taxation increases with 
the degrees of substitutability in consumption and production. In a previ-
ous paper, I emphasized that "the welfare cost of (capital income) taxation 
depends essentially on the elasticity of substitution between capital and la-
bor in the production function" (Chamley, (1981)). I compared the result of 
Levhari and Sheshinski (1972) who assumed a linear model, with the value 
of the efficiency cost of taxation in a model of growth with a Cobb-Douglas 
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production function. The welfare cost. of taxation was found to be about 
40 times higher in the linear model of Levhari-Sheshinski than in the Cobb-
Douglas modeP. The one sector linear model of King and Rebelo (1990) and 
Rebelo (1991) is the same as that of Levhari and Sheshinski (1972). In view 
of the previous studies, the claim of a large welfare cost of taxation is not 
new. This paper emphasizes again that the reason for such high values is 
the (assumed) high degree of intertemporal substitution in the production 
function. 
High values of the elasticities of substitution are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to generate the property of endogenous growth. Therefore, in gen-
eral, the efficiency cost of taxation may be higher or lower in the case of 
endogenous growth than in standard models with exogenous technological 
change. 
Since policies have an impact on the long-run growth rate, they may 
generate very significant differences in the long-run. However, the long-run 
impact of a policy is not an appropriate criterion for policy evaluation, as it 
is well known in the standard models of growth. It will be verified here that 
there exist simple revenue neutral tax reforms which improve the long-run 
growth rate, and lower welfare. 
In this paper, I focus on the marginal efficiency cost of taxes (MEC), 
which is defined as the ratio between the welfare impact of a small change 
of the rate of taxation (in terms of a wealth equivalent), and the impact 
on revenues. In some cases, there is a simple relation between the MEC 
and the welfare impact of a change of the tax rate. In other cases, this 
simple relation does not hold because of incidence shifts. The criterion of 
the marginal efficiency cost is more appropriate than the welfare impact: 
a small impact on welfare may be due to a small tax base; in some cases 
a reduction of tax rates may induce a welfare improvement and a revenue 
lSee the case where q =1, Table 1, Chamley (1981). 
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lDcrease. Such a situation cannot be established by considering the welfare 
impact only. 
In order to analyze the effect of tax distortions on the intertemporal al-
location of resources, I consider three separate models; each focuses on a 
specific trade-off: (i) leisure today versus consumption of physical goods in 
the future, (ii) the consumption of physical goods today versus their con-
sumption in the future, (Hi) the allocation of physical and human capital in 
a model with two sectors of production. 
Comparisons between models of exogenous and endogenous growth are 
subject to obvious pitfalls: an arbitrarily chosen structural model gener-
ates, not surprisingly, an arbitrary value of the efficiency cost of taxation. 
However, arbitrary structures may also generate arbitrary responses, say, of 
savings or labor to tax reforms. There is currently less consensus on the long-
run dynamic properties of economies2 , than on the responses to taxation in 
the short-run. I suggest that in comparing different models, one should at 
least verify that they generate plallible responses of consumption or labor 
to tax changes. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first model which presented in 
Section 2, agents choose between leisure and the production of human capital 
which produces output. This model generates the property of endogenous 
growth but it does not require a high degree of intertemporal substitutability. 
The model is a simple extension of the standard (static) model with a leisure-
labor trade-off. The results of the two models can thus be compared when 
their structural parameters are chosen such that they generate the same 
response of labor to the net wage rate. The efficiency cost of income taxation 
is found to be lower in the model with endogenous growth than in the simple 
static model. 
In the model of Section 3, physical capital is the only variable input, 
and the labor supply is fixed. The formulation of the model encompasses 
2For some empirical studies see Barro (1989), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
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the special cases of the standard model with exogenous growth and of the 
linear model of King and Rebelo (1990), which has endogenous growth. It 
is found that a general income tax has a smaller efficiency cost in the basic 
model largely because three quarters of the tax falls on labor which is in 
fixed supply. When the tax is raised only on the income of physical capital, 
it may be higher or lower in the linear model than in the standard model. 
This model is extended as in Barro (1990) to take into account the role 
of government expenditures in the aggregate production function. These ex-
penditures are financed by distortionary taxation, and their level is optimized 
in the second-best. For the computation of the marginal efficiency cost of 
taxation, one can assume, by the envelope theorem, that government expen-
ditures are fixed. Since the growth rate of these expenditures determines the 
growth rate of the economy, it follows immediately that the MEC is the same 
as in an economy with exogenous growth. However, the MEC is significantly 
lower in this case than when government expenditures do not affect indi-
viduals' decisions because publicly provided goods reduce the possibilities of 
intertemporal substitution of the private sector. For the parameters of King 
and Rebelo, this reduction is by a factor of 20 when the share of government 
expenditures in total output is equal to 25 percent. 
The one sector model takes a broad view of capital, which in the words 
of Barro is a "composite of physical and human capital". However, most 
systems of taxation have different impacts on the accumulation of physical 
and human capital. This has been highlighted by Lucas (1990), who notes 
that in a model where the production of human capital requires only hu-
man capital, a wage tax has no effect on the incentive for human capital 
investment: it affects both the return and the opportunity cost in the same 
proportion. A realistic evaluation of the efficiency cost of taxation requires 
therefore a model with two sectors. Such a model is analyzed in Section 
4. The first sector produces physical goods for consumption or investment, 
and the second produces human capital. The model extends those of Uzawa 
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(1965), Lucas (1988) and King and Rebelo (1991). Both sectors have dif-
ferent capital intensities3 , and may have elasticities of substitution that are 
c different from one. The impact of taxation on each of the four factors is 
analyzed separately. 
The following conclusions are robust to the choice of the structural pa-
rameters of the model: (i) as expected, the MEC of the labor income tax in 
the sector of physical goods is very low; (ii) the efficiency cost of the tax 
on capital goods is of the same order of magnitude in both sectors, and its 
value is also of the same order of magnitude ,as in the standard neo-classical 
model; (iii) the only tax which has an MEC of a higher order of magnitude 
is the taxation of the use of time for human capital formation. This tax may 
not be empirically important, however: the specific taxation of time spent at 
school is not a feature of actual tax systems. 
Section 4 analyzes also the impact of taxes on the long-term growth rate. 
It is verified that an efficient tax reform may lower the long-term growth c 
rate. 
Concluding remarks and suggestions for future work are presented in the 
last section. 
2 Output Taxation and the Trade-Off Growth 
versus Leisure 
2.1 The Model 
The model in this section focuses on the impact of the income tax on the 
trade-off between leisure and human capital accumulation: time is used either 
for leisure or for the production of human capital, which determines the level 
of output in goods. There is no intertemporal trade-off in physical goods. 
3When capital intensities are identical, tax reforms induce a massive reallocation of 
resources between the two sectors which is not plausible. 
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Hence, there is no physical capital and a:ll physical goods are consumed. Note 
that in actual economies, the income of human capital dwarfs that of physical 
capital. Hence, the model can be justified as a stylized description which 
.)! 
is compared to other models which focus on the accumulation of physical 
capital. 
There is one representative consumer with the utility function 
,) 
u = -1 f ooe-ptul-17(Ct, hi(1 -It))dt, (1 =I 1. 
- (1 10 
where u is homogenous of degree one4 • The'variables C, h, and l represent 
the levels of consumption, human capital, and time for physical production, 
respectively. Effective labor is the product of human capital and time. In 
order to focus on the trade-off between leisure and the production of hu-
man capital, the amount of time which is devoted to physical production is 
assumed to be fixed and normalized to 1. 
The production function for goods is linear, l ) 
and the production function for human capital is the same as in Lucas (1988): 
Withouth loss of generality, human capital at time 0 is normalized: ho = l. 
)The fiscal instrument is a tax on physical output at the rate 8. Tax 
revenues finance government expenditures. The mechanism by which these 
expenditures have a impact on social welfare need not be made explicit here. 
It is assumed that these expenditures do not affect individuals' choice. This 
assumption will be relaxed in Section 3.4. 
4This function is used in Rebelo (1991). Other utility functions could be considered 
such as u =Log(C) - B(£), with B concave. 
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2.2 The Equilibrium 
A standard exercise shows that the competitive equilibrium is characterized 
by the first order conditions: 
u-cr (A(I - O)Ul + (1 -l&)U2) +g(lt».t = -~t + pAt, 
{ 
_u-cr htU2+>'thtg'(lt) = 0, 
where>' is the current private marginal value of human capital. Since the 
function U is homogenous of degree one, the values of Ul = ul(Ah, (1 -l)h) 
and U2 = u2(Ah, (1 -l)h) depend only on l. Define the variable J1.t = Athf . 
. 
By the first of the two previous conditions, J1.t is constant: 
u-cr (A(I - O)Ul + (1 - It)U2) 
~=J1.= ,
P+ug - 9 
and the level of l is also constant and determined by the equation 
g'
U2 = (A(I - O)Ul + (1 -l)U2)' (1)c P+ug - 9 
Since the value of £ determines the growth rate g(£), the growth rate is 
constant over time, and its value depends on the tax rate O. The term r = 
p+ug is the intertemporal rate of substitution in consumption; it determines 
the rate of return in this economy where there is no physical capital. 
Define the variables wand ill as: 
, g' 
w = 9 (A+ (1-£) U2), and ill = w- T, with T = AO. 
p +ug - 9 Ul P+ug - 9 
These variables can be interpreted as the gross and the net of tax marginal 
productivity of labor, respectively, and T is the tax wedge. With this nota-
tion, the first order condition (1) which determines the labor supply takes 
the form 
This equation would be the same in a standard model with leisure-Iabor 
choice and the proper notation. The comparison between the two models 
will be discussed further at the end of Section 2.3. 
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2.3 The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation 
In order to define the marginal efficiency cost of taxation, assume that the 
economy is on a path with a constant growth rate, and that the ratio between 
government expenditures and output is constant and equal to q. Taxes cover 
expenditures and () = q. At time zero, the rate () is reduced permanently by 
~(). The government is assumed to maintain the same stream of expenditures ) 
and to meet the shortfall of revenues by lump-sum taxation5• Call t:i.B the 
present value of these lump-sum tax revenues. The reduction of the tax rate 
() has a positive effect on welfare which has a. wealth equivalent of ~J. The 
marginal efficiency cost of taxation is defined as the ratio M EO = ~J/ ~B. ), 
The impacts of the tax change on welfare and tax revenues are now analyzed 
separately. 
Welfare 
Since the level of utility on the growth path with a tax rate () is equal to 
1 u l - a (A,1-1)U = -- --.,...;-..:...----,-~ 
1 - up + (u - l)g(l) 
one finds, using U = Ul + (1 - l)u2 and (1 J, that the welfare impact of the ) 
tax change is 
A_a 
U Ul ~u = ( )T~f. (2)p-g1-u 
Its wealth equivalent is t:i.J, where 
AJ -_ T~l, and ~ ,r = p +ug. (3) 
r-g 
It is equal to the present value of the product of the variation of time for 
human capital investment and of the difference between the social and the 
private marginal return, i.e., the tax wedge. 
SIt will be shown in Section 3.4 that this is the correct method of computation when 
government expenditures are endogenous in the second-best. 
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Revenues 
'- .. The assumption made at the beginning of this subsection implies that the 
\.... ~ 
present value of lump-sum taxes which is required to meet the government's 
budget constraint is equal to 
AB = A( 0 - q) = AO . (4) 
r-g r-g 
The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation 
The value of the marginal efficiency cost of taxation follows immediately 
from the expressions (3) and (4): 
(5) 
It is interesting to compare now the previous results with those of the 
static model which focuses on the trade-off between leisure and work. In that 
model, the consumption good c is produced by labor f and the technology 
of production is linear: c =wf, where w is fixed. The utility function of the 
representative individual is of the form u(c, 1 - f). The income equivalent of 
the welfare impact of a change of the tax rate is equal to JiJ = wOAf. This 
formula is equivalent to (3). The impact of the tax change on revenues is 
equal to A-B = wfAO +wOAf, and the marginal welfare cost of revenues is 
equal to 
- rAf 
M EC = wfAO +wOAf." (6) 
The sign of Af is the opposite of that of AO because the tax change is 
compensated. Hence, for given values of the variations of the tax rate AO, 
and of the labor supply Af, M EC < MEC. 
Suppose that changes of the tax rate have the same effect on the choice of 
leisure in the model with endogenous growth and in the static model. Then, 
the marginal efficiency cost of taxation is smaller in the first model than in 
the second. 
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The explanation of this remarkable result follows from the equations (5) 
and (6): changes of the tax rate have the ~ame effect on leisure and welfare 
in the two models. The difference is that (i) in the dynamic model with en-
dogenous growth, the output tax falls on both the return of new investments 
after time zero and on the existing stock at time zero, which is inelastic; (ii) 
in the static model, the second effect does not occur. 
) 
3 Consumption versus Investment in the One 
Sector Model 
In this section, the model is tailored to highlight the impa.ct of taxation on 
the trade-off between consumption and saving of produced goods. A one 
sector model is sufficient for the analysis which emphasizes the role of the 
intertemporal substitution. It will be extended to a two-sector model in 
Section 4. 
) 
) 
3.1 The Model 
Population is constant and labor-augmenting technological change occurs at 
a constant rate of J.L6. There is one produced good which can be used for 
consumption or as an input for production. The level of output per unit of 
labor, y, is a function of the capitaIlabor ratio k: 
J 
y = f(k) with f"(k) < 0, Limk_OJ'(k) = 00, Limk_ooJ'(k) = O. 
Consumers are represented by a single agent who has the utility function 
(u # 1), 
) 
60ne could also assume that population is growing. In this case, JJ should be the sum 
of the growth rates of population and productivity. 
) 
10 
c 
where et is the level of consumption. When the consumption per unit of 
efficient labor is represented by et, the utility function takes the form 
«(1#1). 
The tax rate on capital income is equal to O. As a first step, it is assumed 
that government expenditures do not affect the decisions of the private sec-
tor. It is well known that the dynamics of this model are determined by 
(i) the equation of capital accumulation, ,(ii) the Euler equation, and (iii) 
the convergence to a stationary solution for the variables per unit of human 
capital. The dynamic system is therefore defined by 
".. f(k) - c - p.k,~ =(DB) (1 - O)r - p{ c = c( d - p.), with r = f'(k). 
3.2 Tax Reform 
The methology is the same as in the previous section. Initially the economy 
is on a balanced growth path with a constant tax rate 0, and a flow of 
government expenditures equal to that of revenues. After time 0, the tax 
rate is changed by a small value !:i.(). Changes of tax revenues are met by 
lump-sum transfers. I consider first the impact on welfare. 
3.2.1 ~elfare 
Define by !:i.Ct the perturbation of private consumption at time t, i.e., the 
difference at time t between the level of consumption under the new program 
of taxes and the level of consumption if there had been no reform. The wealth 
equivalent !:i.J of the welfare impact of the tax change is measured by the 
sum of the consumption changes valued at the consumer prices, (which are 
proportional to the marginal utilities of consumption): 
(7) 
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This expression7 can be transformed to highlight the role of capital accumu-
lation. Define by Yt = f(k,) - Jlkt and s, = Yt - Ct the levels of output and 
of saving, net of the accumulat'ion for growth. As for consumption, Ay, and 
As, are the perturbations of Yt and St for t 2 O. Since ACt = AYt - Ast, the 
expression (7) can be rewritten AJ = fooo e-(F-p)'(AYt - Ast)dt. Using the 
same notation, AYt = (r - Jl )Akt =(r - Jl) f~ AsTdr. By substitution in the 
previous equation, one finds that 
which is equivalent to 
AJ = 1 e-(f-I')t((: - Jl) -l)Astdt. (8) t~O (r - Jl) 
This expression has a simple interpretation. The saving of one unit of 
goods generates a permanent income stream of r - Jl on the balanced growth 
path, which is discounted by the private sector at the net rate f since this 
rate determines the relative prices of incomes at different dates. Because of 
growth, the value of the income stream is therefore equal to (r - Jl)/(f - Jl). 
The social gain of the additional saving ASt is the difference between this 
value and the cost of the reduced consumption. The total impact on welfare 
is the discounted sum of the impacts on saving for all instants. 
The wealth equivalent AJ is very sensitive to the difference between the 
rate of return and the growth rate. We may use therefore in its stead a 
consumption equivalent AM, which is defined as the permanent variation of 
the level of consumption per unit of human capital which generates the same 
variation of welfare: 
AM 
and f = r(l - e). (9)AJ = (_r-Jl)' 
7Because of the economy's resource constraint, 0 = fooo e-(r-lA)t Accdt, the wealth equiv-
alent is also equal to the well known expression AJ =foOO(e-(f-P)C - e-(r-p)C)ePCAccdt, 
which is the sum of the products of the tax wedges and the consumption variations. 
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A tax change has an impact on welfare which is equivalent to a permanent 
change of consumption equal to the gap between the gross and the net rate of 
return, multiplied by the present value of additional savings, measured at the 
consumer prices. 
The previous formula which is similar to (3) in the previous section, em-
phasizes the simple point that the efficiency gain of the tax change depends 
on the product of two factors, the tax wedge and the response of savings to 
the tax changes. 
For later use a simple transformation of the previous expression will be 
useful: 
!:!,.J = r() [ e-(f-/A)t!:!"ktdt. (10)Jf~O 
In the standard growth model with a strictly concave production function, 
the economy converges in the long-run to a steady state: at time 0, the level 
of saving jumps up by !:!"so. The growth rate of the economy also jumps 
up. After time 0, on the transition path, the level of saving and the growth 
rate are higher than in the long-term. Both values decrease gradually to 
the long-run levels which do not depend on the tax policy. The rate of 
convergence is asymptotically constant and equal to some value A. Note that 
the property of a constant convergence rate may also be closely approximated 
by other models such as the overlapping generation model of Auerbach et al. 
(1986). Since the variation of saving !:!,.St is approximated by !:!"soe-M , the 
consumption equivalent in (9) is equal to 
!:!"M = !:!"so (_ r() A)' (11)
r-p+ 
In this expression the welfare effect of taxation depends only on the initial 
response of saving to a tax change and on the rate of convergence to the path 
of constant growth. 
Exogenous versus Endogenous Growth 
13 
Assume now that the J?roduction function f is linear. This is the limit case 
of the previous model when the concavity of f becomes vanishingly small. 
The new steady state, after the tax reform, is postponed to the indefinite 
future and the rate of convergence of the intensive variables (e.g. y, k), 
becomes vanishingly small. During the transition, which is now permanent, 
the growth rate depends on the tax policy. This is the linear model model 
of endogenous growth which is analyzed by King and Rebelo (1990). 
We can use the previous analysis to find immediately an expression of the 
welfare impact of taxation. In equation (11), the rate of convergence is Ais 
equal to zero, and the value of the consumption equivalent becomes 
I:1M* = (.;!-).I:1so (12)
r-J-l 
The welfare impacts for the cases of exogenous and endogenous growth are 
measured in the expressions (11) and (12), respectively. These expressions 
use empirically observable variables; they provide a simple tool for the analy-
sis of the differences between the cases of exogenous and endogenous growth. 
Suppose that the structures of the two models are such that the initial 
responses of saving 1:180, to a change of 0 is the same in the two cases. The 
impacts on welfare in the two models are related by 
I:1M* = 1:1M f - J-l + A. 
f-J-l 
As an example, suppose that f = .04, 11 = .02 and A = .04. The welfare 
impact is three times larger in the model with endogenous growth. 
The previous formula enables one to interpret in general, how a given 
rate change has a different impact on welfare in the cases of endogenous and 
exogenous growth, respectively. A large difference between the two cases 
must depend on the choice of the values of the net rate of return, the growth 
rate and the convergence rate A, or on the initial response of the savings 
rates. 
8King and Rebelo (1991) choose r =.032, J.l =.02, a depreciation rate of .1, a capital 
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3.2.2 Revenues 
In the standard model, a general income tax falls on both capital and labor. 
Since the second production factor is inelastically supplied, its taxation is 
not distortionary. The only distortion on the intertemporal allocation of 
resources is created by the tax on capital income. In order to analyze carefully 
the determinants of the efficiency cost of taxation, we have to consider the 
capital income tax and the general income. tax separately. 
The Capital Income Tax 
The impact on tax revenues is measured as in Section 2. Call q the level 
of revenues before the reform: q = (}rk. The interpretation of the expression 
is easier if we assume that the rate () is increased at time 0: fj,,() > O. Three 
effects take place: First, the higher value of () increases revenues through a 
direct effect. Second, the tax increase is partially shifted to labor. Third, 
the level of capital falls gradually after time 0, thus decreasing the tax base 
and the amount of revenues. This decomposition is now made more specific. 
The impact on revenues is equal to 
fj"Bc = fj" 100 e-(1-8)R(t)+lJt((}rtkt - q)dt, (13) 
where R(t) is the rate of return between 0 and t: R(t) = I~ rordT. In the 
original position, (}rk - q = O. Therefore, the impact through the discount 
factor e-(1-8)R(t)+lJt is nil, and the previous expression is equivalent to 
share of 0' =.33 in the case of exogenous g~owth, and 1 in the case of endogenous growth; 
for 0' = .33, ~ = .13. The ratio l!1M· /l!1M = (f - P + ~)/( ='p) is therefore equal to 
about 12. Note however, that a convergence rate of .13 is very high: it implies a half-
period of about 4 years. In addition, the response of net saving is 4.3 times higher in the 
endogenous growth model than in the standard case. The product of the two terms is 
about 50.5. Given the sensitivity of this number (see below), it is well within the same 
range of 41, which is the number of King and Rebelo (65.4/1.6 in their Table 4). 
15 
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Since kf1rt = -f1Wh we find 
f1Bc =f1() _rk _ () foo e-(l"-I')tf1Wtdt - f1J. (14)r - p. lo .), 
The three terms correspond to the direct effect, the variation of the in-
cidence on labor, and the incentive effect on saving, which is the same as 
the welfare effect (in wealth equivalence). The second term is positive if 
)
f1() is positive because an increase of taxation reduces the capital stock and 
the wage rate9 • The last term is equal to the welfare cost of taxation f1J 
(f1J > 0), and, with the current sign convention, is the opposite of the value 
in equation (10). 
The Income Tax 
The income tax is levied on the incomes of both capital and labor. Rev-
enues are equal to q = ()y, and the impact of a rate change on revenues is 
equal to 
f1B] = f18-;J!- - f1J, (15)
r-J-l 
In this case the shift to labor (the second term in (14)), does not appear 
because the tax is on all factors. 
3.3 The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation: A Com-
parison between Exogenous and Endogenous Growth 
As in the previous section, the marginal efficiency cost is the ratio between 
the marginal effects on welfare and on revenues: M EC = f1J/ f1B. For the 
income tax, the marginal efficiency cost is equal to 
f1J ) 
MEC] = f1()-11- _ f1J' with f1() > 0, and f1J > O. 
r-p. 
9A straightforward exercise shows that it is equal to (>.. /(r-p+>.))(O/(1-O))rk(110/(r-
p). 
) 
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and the marginal efficiency of the capital income tax is therefore equal to 
MEC = . IlJ. .c llo.J:l£- - 0 roo e-(r-~)t Ilw dt - IlJ r - JJ Jo t 
Numerical values of the marginal efficiency costs of the capital income 
tax and of the general income tax are presented in Tables 1.a-c for different 
choices of the structural parameters. In all the tables the initial value of 
the tax rate is equal to 0 = .2, the total growth rate in the initial position 
is JJ = .02, and the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type with 
a capital share equal to o. For each choice of (1, the third line presents an 
approximation of the initial response of consumption to the tax change (in 
proportional terms). It is computed as follows: the marginal proportional 
reduction of consumption due to a tax decrease is multiplied by the initial 
value of 0 = .2. The value thus obtained provides an approximation of the 
order of magnitude of the response of consumption or saving to an abolishion 
of the tax. 
The Capital Income Tax 
Two differences appear between the standard model with exogenous growth 
(0 = .25), and the linear model (0 = 1), which has endogenous growth. First, 
the tax base in the former model is only one fourth of the base in the latter. 
This tends to increase the efficiency cost of taxation. Second, some of the 
tax incidence is shifted to the inelastic labor in the first model. This effect 
tends to decrease the efficiency cost of taxation. It is stronger when there 
is less intertemporal substitution and the incidence is shifted more rapidly. 
In general, the sum of the two effects is ambiguous. The first line of Table 
1.a shows an example of plausible parameter values, in which the marginal 
efficiency cost of the capital income tax is higher in the standard model than 
in the model with endogenous growth. 
Other parameter values show that the order of magnitude of the marginal 
efficiency cost of the capital income tax is not altered by the choice of the 
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rate of return, or of the ,growth rate if (1 is sufficiently large. However, an 
increase of the depreciation rate reduces the efficiency cost by an order of 
magnitude in the standard model. In comparing Tables l.a and l.b, a value of ) , 
Q = .25 with no depreciation (first column in Table l.a), corresponds roughly 
to a value of (the gross capital income share) Q = .33 when the depreciation 
rate is equal to .1, (column 2 in Table l.b). Note that an increase of the 
depreciation rate reduces also the initial response of consumption. In the 
linear model, depreciation has no impact because it does not affect the net 
production function. As in Chamley (1981), the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption has little impact in the standard model and a 
proportional impact in the linear model. For (1 =.5 and 8 == .2, a reduction 
of the tax rate improves revenues and welfare. 
These remarks imply that the choice of the depreciation rate and of (1 
affects in an important way the difference in the efficiency costs of the capital 
income tax between the standard and the linear models. j ,: 
The General Income Tax 
We have seen that for a given value of the tax rate 8, the efficiency cost 
of the general income tax is much smaller than that of the capital income 
tax in the standard model because its base includes that of the (fixed) labor. 
The MEC of the income tax is about one fourth of the MEC of the capital 
income tax. In the linear model however, all income is generated by capital 
and the MEC of the two taxes are obviously identical. 
. '> 
Finally, the parameter values of King and Rebelo are used for Table I.e. 
They chose a value of (1 which is one. The marginal efficiency cost of the 
income tax is 60 times larger when Q = 1 than when Q = .33. This factor 
is higher than their number (about 40), because they consider the impact 
on welfare and not the marginal efficiency cost. As explained before, the 
large difference between the two cases has a simple explanation. In the 
standard model, the major part of the income tax falls on labor which is 
18 
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supplied inelastically. When one considers only the capital income tax, the 
gap between the values in the two case~ j reduced significantly. 
As emphasized in the discussion following (9), large values of the efficiency 
cost are associated to large responses of savings to the tax changes. Since 
numerous studies have found some difficulties in establishing a relation be-
tween taxes and savings, such large values of the response of consumption to 
tax changes or of the efficiency cost of taxation do not seem to be plausible. 
3.4 Government Spending as a Production Input 
Public expenditures on investment for infra~tructure, maintenance, or ser-
vices may be arguments in the production function or the utility function 
of consumers. They may thus affect the interaction between saving and the 
rate of return. We have seen that this interaction is an important determi-
nant of the efficiency cost of taxation. A model of government spending with 
endogenous growth was first proposed by Barro (1991). I use here the same 
model and I focus on the case of public spending as a production input. 
The production function takes the form Y = F(I<, L, P), where P is the 
level of public consumption. The extension to public investment would be 
straightforward. The function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas: 
where 0, (3 and I are positive parameters. L represent some fixed input 
which may be labor, and which has a fixed growth rate Po: 
For simplicity, the production function has constant returns to scale in the 
variable inputs: °+1= 1. 
Government expenditures are financed either by a tax on capital income 
or a general income tax, at the rate O. Note that there are constant returns 
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to scale in capital and government spending and that the growth rate is 
endogenous to the fiscal policy. In the second-best, the government optimizes 
both the level of the tax rate () and the stream of expenditures. A simple 
exercise shows that the dynamic path under the efficient fiscal policy is a 
balanced growth path with a growth rate p ~ po. In the second-best, the 
level of welfare is obviously smaller than if public spending could be financed 
by lump-sum taxation. Some numerical comparisons were presented by Barro 
(1991 ). 
Let us now consider the following experiIpent. In the initial state of the 
economy, government spending is financed only by the capital income tax or 
the income tax and the value of the tax rate () is optimized. At time zero, ) 
a lump-sum tax is introduced which generates a revenue of one unit. The 
tax rate () and the level of government expenditures are then reoptimized. 
By the envelope theorem, the impact on welfare is the same as when govern-
ment expenditures do not change, and revenues of the distortionary tax are 
reduced by the amount of the lump-sum tax. This is the experiment which 
was conducted in the previous sections. For the computation of the mar-
ginal efficiency cost, one can therefore assume that the level of government 
spending is a fixed input, and that the production function takes the form ) 
where a is equal to one minus the share of government expenditures. ), 
Therefore, the welfare cost of taxation is the same as in the case of "ex-
ogenous growth" in which the share of capital is replaced by one minus the 
share of government expenditures. 
Although the growth rate is endogenous to policy, the efficiency cost of 
taxation is the same as that of a model where growth is exogenous. This 
property illustrates that whether growth is endogenous or not is largely ir-
relevant for the determination of the efficiency cost of taxation. 
In general, the introduction of a small share of government expenditures in 
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the production is sufficient to reduce dramatically the efficiency cost, when-
ever this cost is very high with a linear technology. For example, in the case 
of the parametric values considered by King and Rebelo, MECI is reduced 
by a factor of 6 when the share of government expenditures in production 
increase from 0 to 0.1, (from 2.0 to .3526 in the line u = 1 in Table l.c). 
If the share of government expenditures is equal to .75 (which is thevalue 
considered in Barro (1989)), M ECI is reduced by a factor of 18. Such large 
variations show that whenever the efficien~y cost is much higher in the case 
of endogenous growth than in the standard.neoclassical model, its value is 
extremely sensitive to the structural parameters. 
4 A Two Sector Model 
Any evaluation of a tax reform has to deal with the relative magnitudes of 
the efficiency costs of the taxes on capital and labor (or human capital), re-
spectively. The analysis of this problem requires a model which distinguishes 
the two types of capital. A moderate degree of empirical realism suggests 
also that the productions of physical and human capital use different tech-
nologies. These issues are now analyzed in a model where physical goods and 
human capital are produced in two different sectors. 
4.1 The Model 
As in Section 3, there is one type of physical goods and its production tech-
nology is represented by the function Y = F(I(}, Hd, which has constant 
returns to scale, and where 1(1 and HI are the inputs of physical and human 
capital, respectively. All production functions are net of depreciation. 
The output of human capital is determined by another function, which 
has also constant returns to scale. Since human capital is not consumed, its 
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production is equal to its accumulation: 
(16) ,) 
The accumulation of physical capital is the same as in the previous section: 
(17) 
)
where C is total consumption, and consumers have also the same represen-
tation. 
The resources constraints are determined· by the two previous equations 
and 
, ) 
For simplicity, time subscripts are omitted whenever possible. 
In this section, the role of government expenditures is neglected and all 
taxes are refunded in lump-sum fashion. There are four tax instruments, one ,j) 
on each of the factors of production in the two sectors. The tax rates on the ! 
incomes of ](i and Li are equal to Ori and Owi, respectively. 
The equations of inter-temporal arbitrage are 
. C 
C = -((1 - Ort}F1 - p),
u 
and 
where p is the price of human capital in terms of physical capital. 
The equations of intra-temporal arbitrage are 
)and 
These 8 equations and the convergence to a balanced growth path deter-
mine a unique path for the variables ](llHl, ](2, H2 , ](, H, C and p. The 
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dynamic properties of this model have .been analyzed by Mino (1992)10. For 
further discussion it is assumed that both production functions a.re Cobb-
Douglas: 
and 
4.2 Impacts of Tax Changes 
The marginal efficiency cost of taxation is defined as in the previous sections. 
For its computation, one could express all variables as ratios with respect to 
the level of human capital, H. In this formulation, the dynamic system has 
one state variable which is the ratio J{/ H. Therefore, the algorithm of the 
previous section could be used herell . For reasons of generality however, a 
different procedure will be followed. The impact of a tax change on welfare 
and revenues is computed when 0'1 + (31 < 1 and 0'2 + (32 < 1. In this 
case, there are two state variables J{ and H, and two stable eigenvalues 
which determine two rates of convergence. The method of approximations 
of integrals that was used in the previous section is extended to take this 
into account. Then, the parameter values are chosen such that 0'1 + (31 and 
0'2 + (32 are vanishingly close to 1. 
Numerical results are presented in Tables 2-5 for different choices of struc-
tural parameters and fiscal instruments. The base case is presented in Table 
2 with a net rate of return of 2 percent, a growth rate (population plus tech-
nological change) of 2 percent, an elasticity of the marginal utility (1 equal 
10Mino assumed strictly concave production functions. The dynamics of the linear case 
were analyzed in the original paper of Uzawa (1965) which inspired many of the recent 
studies, (e.g., Lucas (1988), Caballe and Santos (1991), Cha.mley (1991), Mulligan and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992». 
llThis property is exploited by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991) for the exact compu-
tation of the dynamic path. 
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to 2, and no depreciation of capital. The shares of physical capital in the 
two sectors are equal to .25 and .15, respectively. The first of these two 
numbers is standard. There is no consensus on the second number, but it is 
smaller than the first because the production of human capital is probably 
more intensive in human capital than the production of physical goods. 
In Table 2.a, the economy is at time 0 on a balanced growth path with one 
tax rate set at .2 and all other rates set at O. Each tax reform is a variation ) 
of the unique rate that is different from O. In Table 2.b, all tax rates are 
equal to .2 in the initial position, and each t,ax reform changes only one tax 
rate. 
The term I:::.J1J in the first line measures the welfare impact of a tax 
reduction expressed as an equivalent proportional increase of consumption (or 
wealth), on the balanced growth path. It is computed as a marginal welfare 
change, but in order to facilitate its interpretation the marginal change is 
multiplied by the tax rate 0 = .2 in the tables. The presentation of the 
initial response of consumption (I:::.Co)1C to the tax reform is the same as 
in the previous section. The term (I:::.Go)IG is the response of investment in 
human capital to the tax reform at time zero. The term I:::.p, represents the 
impact of the tax reform on the growth rate in the long-run. As for (I:::.Co)IC, 
both I:::.Go1G and I:::.p, are presented as the product of the marginal impact 
of a tax change and of the initial value of the tax rate (0 = .2). 
4.2.1 The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation 
Factor Taxation in the Production of Physical Goods (Sector 1) 
The marginal efficiency cost of the wage tax in Sector 1 is positive 
because the tax reduces the incentive for the utilization of physical capital in 
sector 2. Note that if the production of human capital would not require any 
physical capital, the wage tax would not be distortionary, because it affects 
the return and the cost of human capital production in the same way, (Lucas 
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(1989)). This is verified in Tables 3.~ and 3.b for the case a2 = o. The 
benchmark case in which a2 = .15, is not significantly different from the case 
that was considered by Lucas, hence the small marginal efficiency cost of the 
wage tax. When the share of labor in Sector 2 is increased to 1, the MEC 
increases as expected, but its level remains moderate, with maxima of 0.1053 
and 0.2399 in Tables 3.a and 3.b, respectively. The impact of the wage tax 
through the leisure-human capital formation has been analyzed in Section 2. 
The marginal efficiency cost of the capital income tax is of the same 
order of magnitude as in the basic model of exogenous growth. It is equal 
to 0.2334 in the latter model, (Table l.a), and to 0.3220 in Table 2.a, with 
identical values of aI, (j and of the discount rate r-. Note that the MEC is 
lower and equal to .0846 when all other tax rates are equal to .2 (Table 2.b): 
we have seen in the previous section that changes of the tax rates produce 
smaller changes of the tax base in this case, and therefore larger changes of 
c: revenues. 
Factor Taxation in the Production of Human Capital (Sector 2) 
The striking feature in all the tables is the high value of the MEC of the 
wage tax in Sector 2. In a few cases, incentive effects are so strong that a 
reduction of the tax rate from its initial value of .2 increases both welfare 
and revenues (for (j ::; .5 in Table 4a, and (j ::; 1 in Table 4.b). The MEC 
is especially high when the initial position is defined by a uniform tax on all 
incomes, and it is very sensitive to the choice of the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution. 
The MEC of the capital income tax in Sector 2 has a fairly high value 
but it is stable with respect to the parameters that are considered here. As 
for the wage tax, the MEC is particularity high when other taxes are in place. 
Other Policies 
A tax on all factors in the same sector is equivalent to a sales tax. The 
c 
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impact of changing the ra.tes of the sales taxes in the two sectors are presented 
in Columns 5 and 6 of the tables. One can verify that there are the averages I) 
of the impacts of the factor taxes. Finally the case of the uniform tax on 
all factors (which is equivalent to a uniform sales tax), is presented in the 
last column. Note that it is the same as in the one sector model. This was 
pointed already by King and Rebelo (1990). 
The case where government expenditures enter the production functions 
could be analyzed in the previous section. Numerical results are omitted here 
because they are similar to those of the one sector model. The introduction 
of these expenditures may reduce dramatically the MEC of the wage tax 
when it is high. 
4.2.2 The Responses of Consumption and Capital Allocation 
The values of initial responses of physical consumption and human capital 
investment bear consideration because they help explaining why some values 
of the MEC are so high. Some of the cases should be excluded because they 
generate responses which are not realistic. Consider first the wage tax in 
Sector 2. Its MEC is very high when (I is not strictly greater than 1, (Tables 
4.a and 4.b). In some cases, a rate reduction even improves revenues. A 
low value of (I corresponds to a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
The tables show that the initial response of consumption is indeed very high. 
A reduction of the tax rate from .2 to 0 would bring a massive reallocation 
of resources. Consumption falls by about 20 to 30 percent. This order of 
magnitude does not seem to be plausible. 
The large impact on the reallocation of capital between the two sectors 
is not associated to a large efficiency cost. This is best seen in Tables 3.a 
and 3.b, where the share of the income of physical capital varies in Sector 
2. When the capital intensities of the two sector becomes similar, small tax 
"j 
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changes induce huge a huge reallocation on the margin12, but the MEC varies 
continuously in terms of the capital iniensities. 
4.2.3 Impact on the Growth Rate in the Long-run 
Tax policies affect the long-run growth rate because they have an effect on 
the rate of accumulation of human capital in the long-run. It is well known 
that in the standard model of growth, long-run effects do not provide good 
criteria for policy evaluation. The same remark applies here. Positive effects 
on the long-run level of output or consumption may be generated by tax 
changes which are not welfare improving. 
In general, there is no simple relation between the impacts of tax reform on 
welfare, tax revenues and the long-term growth rate. It is therefore possible 
to find reforms which increase both welfare and revenues and decrease the 
long-term growth rate. This can be verified in the following case. Suppose 
that in the initial state, there is a uniform income tax on all factors and that 
the share of physical capital in Sector 2 is very small, albeit not zero. This is 
the case which is presented in Table 3.b for 02 ~ O. The tax rate on capital 
in Sector 2 has a vanishingly small impact on the long-term growth rate, but 
its MEC does not tend to zero as its base becomes very small. Since its MEC 
is greater than that of the wage tax in the same sector, (1.33 versus 1.1592), 
there is a revenue neutral shift of taxation from capital to labor in Sector 2 
which improves welfare. Because the wage tax reduces the long-term growth 
rate (last line of the table), the tax shift has a negative impact on long-term 
growth. 
12Note that the case of identical capital intensities which was the only one considered by 
King and Rebelo is in general not compatible with an interior solution for the equilibrium. 
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5 Conclusion' 
This paper began with an investigation whether a property of endogenous 
growth should induce us to revise our view on the efficiency cost of taxation. 
The general conclusion is that the standard principles of public finance still 
apply: one should consider carefully the impact of taxes on specific trade-offs, 
and the assumptions made on the structure of these trade-offs. The property 
of endogenous growth is per se not important for the order of magnitude of 
the efficiency cost. 
It has been found that in models of endogenous growth, most taxes have 
a efficiency cost of the same order of magnitude as in standard models: these 
include taxes on the trade-offs between leisure and production (either for 
physical goods or for human capital), taxes on the income of physical capital, 
and taxes on consumption. 
The only tax which may have a high MEC was found to be the tax on 
human capital which is used for the production of human capital. This 
high value of the MEC is very sensitive to the assumptions which define the 
stucture of the model (e.g., on the role of public expenditures). It depends on 
the (untested) assumption of a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
but it does not depend on the property of endogenous growth. 
For future research, a more precise evaluation of the MEC of taxation 
would require first, an explicitly estimated model which focuses on the values 
of the elasticities of substitution of the available trade-offs, second, a careful 
examination of how the tax system affects specific trade-offs. 
The taxation of human capital input for the production of human capital 
can be viewed as a particularily strong form of the taxation of intermediate 
goods13, which is known to be inefficient in many situations (Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1970)). However, it is doubtful whether this form of taxation is 
13Note that in the first model with the trade-off between leisure and human capital 
formation, the output tax in not on an intermeditate good. 
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empirically important: One does not ob.serve the taxation of time that is used 
for studying, or the of the output of research in universities. On the contrary, 
many activities which are involved in the formation of human capital are 
subsidized. 
Such subsidies are in general motivated by a belief that externalities occur 
in human capital formation, and that they cannot be internalized by markets. 
This issue was not addressed here because we maintained the framework of 
a second-best without externalities. The presence of externalities raise two 
Issues. 
First, is the welfare cost of missing markets greater in models of endoge-
nous growth than in standard models? The answer seems to be similar to 
the one given here for the MEC of taxation. This can be seen easily by 
considering the first model in which agents optimize their leisure decision 
according to the market wage rate. Should this wage rate be different from 
the social marginal value of labor, the social costs due to the misallocation 
of time would be, for a given elasticity of the labor supply, of the same order 
of magnitude in the static model and in the model of endogenous growth. 
Second, do externalities change the dynamic pattern of efficient taxes on, 
say, labor? As we have seen, under some condition, a wage tax at a constant 
rate is neutral on human capital accumulation, (Lucas (1990)). However, 
a cycling pattern of tax rates may have an effect on the average level of 
human capital accumulation in the long-run. This problem, which may has 
implications for the design of optimal taxation or the impact of exogenous 
cycles, is analyzed in forthcoming work, (Chamley, (1992)). 
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ITable l.a . 
The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation 
(r(1 - (}) = .04, «5 =0) . 
Capital Share 0.25 0.33 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.90 1.0 
!I 
(J =3.0 
, 
MECc 0.2105 0.2109 0.2134 0.2121 0.2102 0.2076 0.2000 
MEC] 0.0526 0.0696 0.1600 ·0.1697 0.1787 0.1869 0.2000 
ACo/C -0.0556 -0.0636 -0.0966 -0.0998 -0.1029 -0.1058 -0.1111 
(J = 2.0 
') 
MECc 0.2334 0.2403 0.2967 0.3047 0.3126 0.3202 0.3333 
MEC] 0.0583 0.0793 0.2225 0.2437 0.2657 0.2881 0.3333 
ACo/C -0.0724 -0.0839 -0.1373 -0.1434 -0.1493 -0.1552 -0.1667 
(J = 1.0 
MECc 0.2667 0.2850 0.4951 0.5481 0.6153 0.7034 1.0000 
MEC] 0.0667 0.0940 0.3713 0.4385 0.5230 0.6331 1.0000 
ACo/C -0.1111 -0.1312 -0.2421 -0.2579 -0.2747 -0.2927 -0.3333 
(J = 0.5 
MECc 0.2927 0.3213 0.7688 0.9427 1.2294 1.7964 *** 
MEC] 0.0732 0.1060 0.5766 0.7542 1.0450 1.6167 *** 
ACo/C -0.1667 -0.1994 -0.4079 -0.4436 -0.4844 -0.5323 -0.6667 
,** A reduction of (} increases both welfare and revenues. ,) 
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Table l.b 
The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation 
(r(l - 0) = .04, 6 = 0.1) 
Capital Share 0.25 0.33 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.90 1.0 
(1 =3.0 
MECc 0.0837 0.0906 0.1593 0.1727 0.1863 0.1985 0.2000 
MECI 0.0094 0.0143 0.0830 0.1017 0.1242 0.1504 0.2000 
D.('o/C -0.0245 -0.0301 -0.0709 "-0.0781 -0.0860 -0.0945 -0.1111 
(1 = 2.0 
,","., MECc 0.0862 0.0941 0.1856 0.2085 0.2364 0.2694 0.3333 
MECI 0.0098 0.0149 0.0973 0.1236 0.1584 0.2048 0.3333 
D.Co/C -0.0307 -0.0379 -0.0948 -0.1060 -0.1188 -0.1334 -0.1667 
(1 = 1.0 
"- . MECc 0.0894 0.0988 0.2270 0.2690 0.3301 0.4267 1.0000 
MECI 0.0102 0.0157 0.1203 0.1612 0.2235 0.3270 1.0000 
D.Co/C -0.0448 -0.0557 -0.1510 -0.1726 -0.1991 -0.2325 -0.3333 
(1 =0.5 
-. MECc 0.0918 0.1021 0.2615 0.3232 0.4243 0.6222 *** 
MECl 0.0105 0.0163 0.1399 0.1955 0.2902 0.4816 *** 
D.Co/C -0.0647 -0.0808 -0.2329 -0.2708 -0.3199 -0.3870 -0.6667 
33 
34 
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Table 2.a 
The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation 
(One instrument in the original position) 
(All initial impacts follow a reduction of the tax rate(s» 
Variable °rl Owl 01 O2°r2 °W2 ° 
(~J~/J 0.0175 0.0054 0.0045 0.0664 0.0201 0.0746 0.0833 
ME 0.3220 0.2342 0.0254 0.9674 0.0945 0.9489 0.3330 
-0.0070 -0.0273 -0.0226 . -0.0820 -0.0324 -0.1013 -0.1636~~Coyc ~Go /G -0.7561 -0.0343 -0.0398 1.4318 -1.0019 1.4166 0.4329 
~J.l 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 Q..0035 0.0008 0.0042 0.0050 
~.	 In the initial position, one tax instrument is different from zero. 01 = Orl = Owl. 
° = Orl = Owl = 0r2 = 0w2' 
Sum of productivity and population growth rates J.l = 2%; net long-term net rate of 
return r'" = p +uJ.l = 4%; U = 2. 
Table 2.b 
The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation 
(Uniform income tax in the original position) 
Variable °rl Or2 Owl °W2 01 O2 ° 
0.0039 0.0104 0.0104 0.0585 0.0144 0.0689 0.0833(~J~/J 
ME 0.0846 1.0941 0.0747 1.0751 0.0772 1.0779 0.3330 
-0.0242 -0.0216 -0.0216 -0.0962 -0.0458 -0.1178 -0.1636~~Co~/C~Go/G -1.0106 -0.0145 -0.0145 1.4724 -1.0251 1.4580 0.4329 
~J.l 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 0.0035 0.0008 0.0042 0.0050 
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" '--- Table 3.b 
Variation of the Capital Income Share in Sector 2 
( 
(Uniform Income Tax in the original position) 
Variable Orl Or2 Owl Ow2 01 O2 
02 =0 
MEC 0.0807 1.3300 0.0000 1.1592 0.0197 1.1592 0.3251 
-0.0505 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0909 -0.0505 -0.0909 -0.1414~~Co)lC ~Go /G -0.2576 0.0000 0.0000 0.6364 -0.2576 0.6364 0.3788 
~J.L 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0050 0.0000 0.0050 0.0050 
02 = .15 
MEC 0.0846 1.0941 0.0747 1.0751 0.0772 1.0779 0.3330 
-0.0242 -0.0216 -0.0216 -0.0962 -0.0458 -0.1178 -0.1636~~CoYC~Go /G -1.0106 -0.0145 -0.0145 1.4724 -1.0251 1.4580 0.4329 
~J.L 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 0.0035 0.0008 0.0042 0.0050 
02 =0.25 
MEC 0.1111 1.0000 0.1111 1.0000 0.1111 1.0000 0.3333 
-0.0104 -0.0313 -0.0313 -0.0937 -0.0417 -0.1250 -0.1667~~Co)lC ~Go /G -530.9 -27.9 -27.9 586.9 -558.88 559.01 0.2499 
~J.L 0.0003 0.0009 0.0009 0.0028 0.0012 0.0038 0.0050 
02 = .75 
MEC 0.2143 0.7500 0.2143 0.7500 0.2143 0.7500 0.3333 
-0.0208 -0.0625 -0.0625 -0.0208 -0.0833 -0.0833 -0.1667~~Co)/C 
~Go)/G -0.3437 0.0938 0.0938 0.1562 -0.2500 0.2500 0.0000 
~J.L 0.0006 0.0019 0.0019 0.0006 0.0025 0.0025 0.0050 
02 = .99 
MEC 0.2399 0.6864 0.2399 0.6864 0.2399 0.6864 0.3333 
-0.0237 -0.0711 -0.0711 -0.0007 -0.0948 -0.0718 -0.1667~~Co)/C ~Go /G -0.2410 0.1182 0.1182 0.0046 -0.1228 0.1228 0.0000 
~J.L 0.0007 0.0021 0.0021 0.0000 0.0028 0.0022 0.0050 
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Table 4.a 
Variation of the Intertemporal Elasticity 
of Substitution in Consumption 
(One instrument in the original position) 
Variable Orl Or2 OWl Ow2 01 O2 0 
q= .5 J 
(~J~/J 0.0181 0.0101 0.0084 ·0.1869 0.0270 0.2418 0.3321 
ME 0.3359 0.5497 0.0486 *** 0.1312 *** 305.188 ~~Co)lC~Go IG -0.0776 -0.6666 -0.1109 0.1675 -0.0918 0.1466 -0.3919 2.0939 -0.1742 -0.7486 -0.4323 2.3146 -0.6189 1.6783 
~p, 0.0008 0.0025 0.0025 0.0142 0.0033 0.0167 0.0200 ) 
q = 1.0 
I 
I 
(~J~/J 0.0177 0.0070 0.0058 0.1066 0.0224 0.1304 0.1663 
ME 0.3266 0.3245 0.0330 2.9254 0.1065 3.8476 0.9967 
~~Co)IC -0.0309 -0.0568 -0.0470 -0.1877 -0.0811 -0.2163 -0.3211 ) ~Go)IG -0.7259 0.0347 0.0237 1.6556 -0.9159 1.7224 0.8567 
~p, 0.0004 0.0013 0.0013 0.0071 0.0017 0.0083 0.0100 
q = 2.0 
(~J~/J 
ME 
0.0175 
0.3220 
0.0054 
0.2342 
0.0045 
0.0254 
0.0664 
0.9674 
0.0201 
0.0945 
0.0746 
0.9489 
0.0833 
0.3330 
:.J 
~~Co)lC ~Go IG -0.0070/ -0.7561 -0.0273 -0.0343 -0.0226 -0.0398 -0.0820 1.4318 -0.0324 -1.0019 -0.1013 1.4166 -0.1636 0.4329 
~p, 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 0.0035 0.0008 0.0042 0.0050 
q = 3.0 ) 
(~J~/J 0.0175 0.0049 0.0040 0.0530 0.0193 0.0560 0.0555 
ME 0.3204 0.2067 0.0228 0.6676 0.0905 0.5983 0.1999 
~~Co~/C~Go IG 0.0011 -0.7663 -0.0171 -0.0577 -0.0142 -0.0613 -0.0462 1.3565 -0.0158 -1.0308 -0.0619 1.3132 -0.1097 0.2896 
~p, 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0024 0.0006 0.0028 0.0033 ' )' 
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Table 4.b 
Variation of the Intertemporal Elasticity 
of Substitution in Consumption 
(Uniform income tax in the original position) 
Variable (Jrl (Jr2 (Jwl (Jw2 (JI (J2 (J 
(7= .5 
(t!J.J~1 JME 0.0156 0.4499 0.0416 *** 0.0416 0.3835 
.0.2332 
*** 
0.0572 
0.3996 
0.2748 
*** 
0.3321 
305.188 
~t!J.Co)IC
t!J.Go IG 
-0.0930 
-0.8839 
-0.0818 
0.1462 
-0.0818 
0.1462 
-0.3621 
2'.2698 
-0.1749 
-0.7377 
-0.4440 
2.4160 
-0.6189 
1.6783 
t!J.p, 0.0008 0.0025 0.0025 0.0142 0.0033 0.0167 0.0200 
(1 = 1.0 
(t!J.JJI J 
~IE 
0.0078 
0.1845 
0.0209 
*** 
0.0209 
0.1612 
0.1168 
*** 
0.0287 
0.1670 
0.1377 
*** 
0.1663 
0.9967 
~t!J.CoYC
t!J.Go IG 
-0.0477 
-0.9675 
-0.0424 
0.0402 
-0.0424 
0.0402 
-0.1886 
1.7438 
-0.0901 
-0.9273 
-0.2310 
1.7840 
-0.3211 
0.8567 
t!J.p, 0.0004 0.0013 0.0013 0.0071 0.0017 0.0083 0.0100 
q = 2.0 
~-i~/J 0.0039 0.0846 0.0104 1.0941 0.0104 0.0747 0.0585 1.0751 0.0144 0.0772 0.0689 1.0779 0.0833 0.3330 
~t!J.Co)IC -0.0242 -0.0216 -0.0216 -0.0962 -0.0458 -0.1178 -0.1636 
t!J.Go)IG
t!J.p, 
-1.0106 
0.0002 
-0.0145 
0.0006 
-0.0145 
0.0006 
1.4724 
0.0035 
-1.0251 
0.0008 
1.4580 
0.0042 
0.4329 
0.0050 
q = 3.0 
(t!J.J~1 J 0.0026 0.0070 0.0070 0.0390 0.0096 0.0459 0.0555 
ME 0.0549 0.5347 0.0486 0.5278 0.0502 0.5288 0.1999 
~~Co)lC ~Go IG -0.0162 -1.0252 -0.0145 -0.0330 -0.0145 -0.0330 -0.0646 1.3807 -0.0307 -1.0582 -0.0791 1.3478 -0.1097 0.2896 
t!J.p, 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0024 0.0006 0.0028 0.0033 
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Table 5.a 
Variation of the Net of Rate of Return 
()i(One instrument in the original position) 
Variable Orl Or2 Owl Ow2 01 O2 0 
p. = .025 J 
MEC 0.3693 0.2635 0.0847 1.5290 0.1930 1.6156 1.6659 
~LiCo)/CLiGo /G 
Lip. 
-0.0095 
-0.3170 
0.0001 
-0.0622 
-0.1456 
0.0004 
-0.0516 
-0.1487 
0.0004 
. -0.1471 
0.9970 
0_0022 
-0.0558 
-0.5322 
0.0005 
-0.1921 
0.8763 
0.0026 
-0.2742 
0.2744 
0.0031 
p. = .03 
MEC 0.3419 0.2337 0.0457 1.0120 0.1280 0.9892 0.5996 
~LiCo)/CLiGo /G 
Lip. 
-0.0070 
-0.4643 
0.0002 
-0.0404 
-0.1061 
0.0005 
-0.0334 
-0.1101 
0.0005 
-0.1080 
1.1413 
0.0027 
-0.0408 
-0.6895 
0.0006 
-0.1389 
1.0564 
0.0031 
-0.2109 
0.3272 
0.0038 
p. = .04 
MEC 0.3220 0.2342 0.0254 0.9674 0.0945 0.9489 0.3330 
~LiCo)/CLiGo /G 
Lip. 
-0.0070 
-0.7561 
0.0002 
-0.0273 
-0.0343 
0.0006 
-0.0226 
-0.0398 
0.0006 
-0.0820 
1.4318 
0.0035 
-0.0324 
-1.0019 
0.0008 
-0.1013 
1.4166 
0.0042 
-0.1636 
0.4329 
0.0050 J 
p. = .05 
MEC 0.3124 0.2471 0.0183 1.1038 0.0829 1.1232 0.2628 
~LiCo)lCLiGo/G 
Lip. 
-0.0075 
-1.0461 
0.0003 
-0.0224 
0.0333 
0.0008 
-0.0185 
0.0266 
0.0008 
-0.0721 
1.7236 
0.0044 
-0.0294 
-1.3128 
0.0010 
-0.0864 
1.7767 
0.0052 
-0.1441 
0.5387 
0.0063 
) 
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Table S.b 
Variation of the Net of Rate of Return 
(Uniform income tax in the original position) 
Variable Or} Or2 OWl Ow2 O} O2 0 
p" = .025 
MEC 0.4474 3.8995 0.4343 3.8445 0.4375 3.8527 1.6659 
-0.0264 -0.0386 -0.0386 .-0.1705 -0.0651 -0.2092 -0.2742~~Co)/C ~Go IG -0.4859 -0.1105 -0.1105 0.9813 -0.5964 0.8709 0.2744 
~J.l 0.0001 0.0004· 0.0004 0.0022 0.0005 0.0026 0.0031 
p" = .03 
MEC 0.1679 1.3809 0.1577 1.3623 0.1603 1.3651 0.5996 
-0.0249 -0.0292 -0.0292 -0.1276 -0.0541 -0.1568 -0.2109~~CorC ~Go IG -0.6622 -0.0774 -0.0774 1.1442 -0.7396 1.0668 0.3272 
~J.l 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0027 0.0006 0.0031 0.0038 
p" = .04 
MEC 0.0846 1.0941 0.0747 1.0751 0.0772 1.0779 0.3330 
-0.0242 -0.0216 -0.0216 -0.0962 -0.0458 -0.1178 -0.1636~~Co)/C ~Go IG -1.0106 -0.0145 -0.0145 1.4724 -1.0251 1.4580 0.4329 
~J.l 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 0.0035 0.0008 0.0042 0.0050 
p" = .05 
MEC 0.0636 1.2118 0.0535 1.1878 0.0560 1.1914 0.2628 
-0.0240 -0.0183 -0.0183 -0.0836 -0.0422 -0.1019 -0.1441~~Co)/C ~Go IG -1.3566 0.0466 0.0466 1.8021 -1.3100 1.8487 0.5387 
~J.l 0.0003 0.0008 0.0008 0.0044 0.0010 0.0052 0.0063 
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